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 Five Fingers or One Hand? 
The BRICS in Development 
 Cooperation
The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa) present a 
political alternative to the development 
cooperation model offered by traditional 
Western donors. Their identity as 
emerging middle-income countries, with 
a common experience of successfully 
generating their own economic 
development, has lent them significant 
credibility and legitimacy in development 
cooperation. New initiatives, such as 
the BRICS development bank, signal the 
mobilisation of the BRICS as a bloc in 
international development. However, 
modes and discourses of development 
cooperation promoted by each country 
remain divergent, with contested views 
of what ‘development’ actually entails. 
‘Aid’ versus ‘partnership’
South–South Cooperation (SSC) is 
a recurrent theme promoted by the 
BRICS, with development assistance 
emphasised as being a ‘partnership’ in 
contrast to a donor–recipient relationship 
of ‘aid’. In the case of China, aid and 
development are two separate concepts 
in official discourse, and connotations of 
foreign intervention mean that China’s 
assistance is not framed as ‘aid’. All of 
the BRICS share a dual identity as both 
providers and recipients of aid. However, 
they are careful not to portray themselves 
as donors, but rather equal partners. 
Although Russia is the exception as the 
only Northern state, it shares a common 
critical attitude to aid conditionality, and a 
commitment to principles of sovereignty, 
horizontality, and non-interference, as 
embodied in the idea of SSC. 
South Africa is the exception. Its political 
development discourse explicitly endorses 
ideals of democracy and human rights 
globally as exemplified by the African 
National Congress (ANC)’s 2004 
manifesto for global engagement, 
which endorsed ‘democracy, peace, 
stability, as well as economic growth 
and development’. All the same, South 
Africa is careful to remain in line with 
the non-interventionist stance of other 
BRICS countries. 
BRICS development cooperation 
in practice
Modes of development cooperation 
employed by the BRICS overlap, with 
technical assistance and education being 
common initiatives. Russia’s development 
assistance since the Soviet period focuses 
primarily on health, education, and 
energy security, though food security 
is a growing focus. China and India are 
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The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are increasingly 
prominent in development cooperation activities in low-income countries in 
Africa and worldwide, presenting a potential alternative to the development aid 
model of traditional donors. However, there are significant differences as well 
as overlaps between them, which need further attention in future engagement. 
This briefing summarises the findings from five IDS State of the Debate reports, 
outlining the contested and shifting discourse on development within and 
between the BRICS states, and the significant recent changes in the BRICS 
development cooperation framework.
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both active in financial programmes, providing 
concessionary loans, lines of credit, and 
resource equity swaps. 
South Africa differs from the other BRICS 
countries in that many of its development 
initiatives centre on providing security 
rather than economic goods, including 
peacekeeping and peace-building efforts 
across the African continent. Though not 
recognised as aid contributions under the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) framework, they nevertheless 
represent an important contribution to 
regional development and stability. 
Geographically, the BRICS have focused 
on neighbouring regions, often referred 
to as ‘the near abroad’. China and India’s 
foreign direct investment (FDI) is largely 
concentrated in South East Asia and South 
Asia respectively, while Russia is an active 
provider of public goods in Central Asia and 
Caucasus. Brazil’s development projects are 
overwhelmingly located in Latin America; 
however, the majority of its funds are 
actually allocated to Africa, indicating a shift 
in focus from the ‘near abroad’ to the ‘far 
abroad’ in its development engagement. 
Africa represents a common ground for 
BRICS involvement, particularly for South 
Africa, for whom regional development 
is an important part of its own national 
interests. While China is commonly perceived 
to be a dominant economic actor in Africa, 
South Africa is, in fact, the largest BRICS 
investor, though driven primarily by the 
private sector.
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Changing institutional frameworks
Development assistance provided by the BRICS remains highly state-centric. However, institutional changes are 
occurring as development cooperation initiatives grow. 
• The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) has been a focus for development cooperation coordination; 
however, Brazil’s SSC delivery and decision-making is dispersed across government institutions. A new agency, 
announced in 2013, could incorporate a combined responsibility for cooperation, investment, and trade with 
Africa and Latin America.
• Russia’s development assistance expenditures and policies are jointly coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. Plans for a new Russian Agency for International Development in 2012 
have stalled, and the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living 
Abroad, and International Cultural Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) remains responsible for bilateral 
development assistance programmes (since May 2013). 
• India’s growing development cooperation has been consolidated through the creation of the Development 
Partnership Administration (DPA) within the Ministry of External Affairs. The DPA is in the process of 
outlining a ‘development compact’ under the framework of SSC.
• In China, development cooperation is primarily managed by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Under 
this, the Department of International Cooperation and the Department for Foreign Cooperation are also 
responsible for receiving and giving aid. Though the former has previously been active in global discussions, 
the latter’s influence domestically has been growing. A new White Paper on foreign aid will be released later 
in 2014.
• South Africa is forming a new coordinating body, the South African Development Partnership Agency 
(SADPA), under the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). This builds on the 
current African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF), and will centralise its current 
development intervention activities.
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State, business, and civil society 
sectors
Lack of institutional capacity and 
underdeveloped regulatory frameworks are 
common problems in the BRICS, stimulating 
trilateral cooperation between Northern and 
Southern countries. For example, Northern 
donors and partners have been crucial in 
building Brazilian SSC, due to its restrictive 
institutional frameworks on procurement 
and financial flows. Successful multilateral 
cooperation on the Russia as a Donor 
Initiative (RDI), supported by the World Bank 
and the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), also aimed to strengthen 
ministerial capacity in international aid. South 
Africa’s geostrategic position within Africa has 
also made it an attractive development partner 
for Northern as well as Southern countries. 
The business sector in BRICS countries has 
also been highly active in the development 
landscape, often independently of the state. 
Alongside technical cooperation, rising levels 
of trade and investment in Africa reflect 
growing economic engagement between 
the emerging powers in the region, as 
well as potential for competition between 
BRICS firms. Paralleling China’s Go Global 
strategy, India’s development cooperation 
has moved to support larger Indian firms 
in the extractive sector, encouraging trade 
and investment as part of its ‘development 
compact’. In contrast, South African firms 
and financial institutions receive minimal 
government support, despite their role in 
regional infrastructure and development 
initiatives. Meanwhile Brazil, under the 
Rousseff presidency, is shifting ideologically 
from its traditional stance on SSC towards a 
stronger alignment between development 
cooperation and trade and investment 
interests. 
On the whole, civil society organisations 
(CSOs) in the BRICS play a limited role in 
development cooperation, though many 
CSOs and NGOs in India, South Africa, 
and Brazil have extensive experience in 
domestic social policy innovations. In the 
peace-building field, South Africa is the 
only BRICS country developing a policy 
on civil participation in peace operations; 
meanwhile, CSOs and academia in Russia 
have contributed to development assistance 
debates through C20 forums. Civil society 
in Brazil and India has been most actively 
involved in development cooperation; in 
India, engagement between civil society 
and the DPA has been institutionalised 
through the recently established Forum for 
Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC). 
Brazil, however, lacks such a formal dialogue 
channel. 
Media, public opinion, and 
transparency
Public discourse on development cooperation 
within the BRICS is diverse, but limited. In 
China, for example, information on aid and 
development is classified, and restrictions on 
policy circles and the media serve to limit 
public debate. In India, the independent 
media have played a critical role in 
development discourse, though public opinion 
is generally supportive of India’s development 
cooperation. 
In contrast to the other BRICS countries, in 
Russia, public opinion towards overseas aid 
is generally negative, though humanitarian 
relief is supported. These contradictory 
trends are rooted in the lack of information 
and absence of a media strategy; as a result, 
public awareness and informed debate is 
low. Russia, however, remains the only 
BRICS country to officially report its ODA 
through the DAC; its strong engagement 
with multilateral organisations stems in part 
from insufficient capacity of its institutions. 
Brazil has also gained significant credibility 
and legitimacy in promoting transparency 
in its development activities. Its recent 
COBRADI report goes furthest of all the 
BRICS countries in publicly reporting its 
development cooperation statistics.
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Policy recommendations
 • Internationally, development cooperation is in a state of flux, and the BRICS 
countries sit at a critical juncture in charting the path of their development 
cooperation practices and institutions. Trilateral cooperation and engagement 
with Northern partners will continue as the BRICS continue to build their 
domestic capacity for development cooperation activities. However, this may be 
a transient phase; as their legal and institutional capacity develops, they may be 
less dependent on Northern and multilateral partners in future. 
 • Russia, as a bridge between Northern and Southern states, is interested and 
well positioned in multilateral forums to spearhead new initiatives for 
international cooperation; indeed, development featured as a priority during its 
G20 presidency. As Russia hosts the 2015 BRICS Summit, it holds a prime 
opportunity to shape the emergence of a BRICS development cooperation 
architecture and to influence the post-2015 development agenda.
 • Norms of non-intervention and non-conditionality continue to inform BRICS 
development cooperation frameworks. Though several BRICS countries have 
previous history of collaboration with the DAC, they generally reject the 
OECD-DAC framework, and are unlikely to commit to Northern-led initiatives 
such as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. These 
normative disagreements will continue to hinder BRICS involvement and 
engagement with Northern partners.
 • Business is a significant and growing driver of BRICS development cooperation, 
though relationships and the degree of coordination with governments vary. As 
outward investment grows, BRICS are moving increasingly towards supporting their 
own trade and investment interests as part of broader development cooperation. 
There is already tangible economic competition between BRICS firms in Africa, which 
may complicate the establishment of a common development cooperation policy.
 • CSOs in many BRICS countries are increasingly important, both in development 
cooperation and in influencing debate and public discourse. As their involvement 
grows, there is a further need to build mechanisms for engaging CSO expertise, both 
through institutional forums with government and in building networks across civil 
society. However, given the wide divergence in government attitudes and civil society 
influence, it is unlikely that such mechanisms can be employed on a bloc-wide basis.
 • Despite a shared rhetoric of horizontality, partnership, and principles of SSC, 
there is no coherent operational framework among the BRICS, and SSC 
remains an amorphous, though politically attractive concept. The formation of 
the BRICS development bank demonstrates that there is a significant drive 
towards creating common mechanisms and standards for development 
cooperation, as well as growing institutional coordination and centralisation for 
international development within each state.
